Trade and investment in services are diffi cult to measure, and the regulatory barriers that inhibit the free fl ow of services are hard to quantify. As a result, very little attention has been paid to dismantling barriers to services trade and investment in free trade negotiations. Th is paper examines what has been achieved in both regional and multilateral compacts by surveying international precedents involving Asian countries which have included services trade reforms. We then assess the prospects for services trade negotiations and explore how services trade negotiations could be pursued over the next decade through two distinct channels: the Trans-Pacifi c Partnership (TPP) and a plurilateral approach among groups of WTO countries. We fi nd that in the case of developing Asia, free trade agreements have largely excluded services or have only committed to "lock in" current practices in a narrow subset of service sectors. Th is is also the case in agreements negotiated between developing countries, which have produced less substantial commitments to liberalize services than those negotiated between developing and developed countries. Multilateral negotiations on services have also underperformed, as substantive negotiations on services in the Doha Round never really got underway. We advocate a stronger eff ort by developing Asian countries to prioritize services negotiations in their regional arrangements, and to expand coverage of services in those pacts to a broad range of infrastructure services that are included in other FTAs in force or under construction in the Asia-Pacifi c region.
INTRODUCTION
Services trade often is given short shrift in trade negotiations. Th e subject only surfaced in multilateral talks late in the postwar era with the conclusion of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) at the end of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations. Th e GATS drew on the experience of services trade provisions in path-breaking trade pacts such as the Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement and the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (FTA), though the resulting multilateral rules were much more limited in scope and in depth of liberalization of existing trade barriers than the regional pacts.
To date, most trade pacts have focused more on merchandise trade than services, and most obligations undertaken with regard to services have simply committed to maintaining current practices.
Th e focus on services has been particularly narrow in negotiations among developing countries, including among those in developing Asia, with the eff ect of discouraging investment and limiting the availability of productive services across the economy.
Services issues span a wide range of governmental jurisdictions, complicating the task of formulating a coherent approach toward services trade policy and negotiations. Th e slow pace of services trade negotiations is at least partly due to the complexity of dealing with a broad range of policy measures aff ecting the provision of services. Unlike merchandise trade, where reducing border restrictions via tariff s and quotas was for many decades the fodder of trade talks, the main barriers to trade and investment in services are imposed through quotas or outright bans on foreign participation in the marketplace, discriminatory licensing and subsidies, public procurement practices, and discriminatory access to distribution networks (Francois, Hoekman, and Woerz 2007) . In addition, service "products" are often non-storable and intangible, creating diff erent barriers to trade in services than those that apply to goods (Fontagné, Guillin, and Mitaritonna 2011) . To be sure, some services restrictions serve legitimate purposes; others mask protectionist intent. Trade negotiations seek to address the latter.
Th e basic principles that govern liberalization in services trade are unconditional most-favored nation (MFN) treatment, national treatment, transparency, and the absence of local presence requirements.
GATS obligations cover national treatment and market access commitments for listed activities (which in principle should be augmented through successive rounds of negotiations). In addition, GATS Article VI.4 outlines disciplines on certain domestic regulations related to licensing and technical standards to ensure regulatory measures are based on objective and transparent criteria and are not more burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality of the services. However, as outlined in the 2012 World Trade Organization (WTO) World Trade Report, progress in this area has been slow and the level of openness across services sectors and countries varies signifi cantly (WTO 2012) . Many developing and emerging Asian economies have only made low level commitments in GATS and have not supplemented those reforms very much in their bilateral negotiations.
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Trade negotiations can contribute to economic growth by reducing or removing impediments to trade and investment in services. Services reforms would enhance competition in the domestic economy, spur innovation and productivity gains in agriculture and manufacturing as well as service industries, and generally generate net job creation in the economy.
Th is paper assesses the prospects for services trade negotiations and the challenges and opportunities they pose for developing countries. We believe that Asian countries should give more priority to services trade talks as part of their overall development strategy. To that end, we fi rst assess the services provisions of the FTA between the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the China-ASEAN, China-New Zealand, and the Malaysia-New Zealand FTAs, and then assess those pacts against the more comprehensive results of the Korea-United States (KORUS) FTA. Th en we look forward to how services trade negotiations could be pursued over the next decade through two distinct channels: the TransPacifi c Partnership (TPP) and a plurilateral approach among groups of WTO countries.
SERVICES IN REGIONAL TRADE PACTS
Th is section surveys and compares the coverage of services in selected trade agreements implemented over the past fi ve years both among Asian countries and between the Asian countries and more developed trading partners. Table 1 summarizes the coverage and content of key components of those pacts. At the other end of the spectrum is the KORUS FTA, which off ers much broader coverage of services. It is the only agreement among the four that uses a negative list approach and provides unconditional MFN and national treatment. Th e one area where it falls short, however, is its coverage of mode 4. Th e limited obligations on the movement of natural persons is due primarily to a congressional mandate that "immigration" issues broadly defi ned not be discussed in the context of a trade pact (Schott 2007) .
Th e following subsections summarize key features of each pact. 15 in 2010, 20 in 2012, 20 in 2014, and 7 in 2015. 3 Additional eff orts to dismantle barriers to services trade were outlined in the AEC Blueprint, adopted in November 2007. One of the key pillars of the AEC Blueprint is the free fl ow of trade in services. Th e AEC Blueprint focuses on fi ve priority services sectors: air transport, e-ASEAN, health care, tourism, and logistics services. Th ese were selected based on comparative advantage in natural resource endowments, labor skills, cost competitiveness, and the value-added contribution to ASEAN economies. Under the AEC Blueprint, "substantially all" restrictions are supposed to be phased out over eight years; priority sectors are to implement reforms within three years, with more sensitive sectors such as logistics given longer adjustment periods.
Intra-ASEAN FTA
An analysis of the progress of AEC Blueprint shows mixed results. During the fi ve rounds of negotiations, ASEAN members concluded seven packages of commitments. However, the extent of commitments to reform and their implementation vary among countries. Th e ASEAN Scorecard (ASEAN Secretariat 2012b) reports that roughly 65 services sectors were scheduled for liberalization under the seventh AFAS Package. However, these commitments contain few provisions beyond existing GATS commitments (Zhang and Shen 2011) .
Analyses by Dee (2010) and Arunanondchai and Fink (2007) China and New Zealand also made important commitments on the movement of natural persons (mode 4), which is covered in a separate chapter. Th e FTA specifi es fi ve categories of persons: business visitors, contractual service suppliers, intra-corporate transferees, skilled workers, and a new category of installers and servicers.
8 Th e length of stay permitted depends on the country and ranges from three months to three years. For example, China allows entry of up to three months for installers and service providers, and allows business visitors to stay for up to six months compared to the 90 day maximum contained in China's GATS schedule. New Zealand allows professionals and intra-corporate transferees to stay for up to three years, and allows all other service providers a stay of up to three months. In addition, China agreed to expedite the processing of visas for services suppliers and business persons, and New
Zealand committed to expedite the application and approval process for certain Chinese visas and create a new group transit visa for Chinese nationals.
Compared to other regional Asia-Pacifi c trade agreements, the New Zealand-China FTA is relatively comprehensive. Th e New Zealand-China FTA provides greater GATS-plus commitments compared to the ASEAN-China FTA, which only includes commitments on a very narrow range of service sectors.
For example, the Chinese commitments exclude key sectors such as tourism, distribution, education,
8. An installer or servicer includes persons who install or service machinery and/or equipment. Th e installation or servicing is done by the supplying company as a condition of purchase of the machinery or equipment.
communication, and fi nancial services, which are important drivers of ASEAN economies (Trewin et al 2008) . In addition, the agreement allows both parties to "adopt or maintain any measure that accords diff erential Th e main achievement of the agreement is the expansion of market access for service suppliers.
Malaysia increased the number of sectors and subsectors subject to liberalization, particularly in education, environmental services, tourism, veterinary services, management consulting, and maritime services.
In contrast, Malaysia did not commit to any liberalization in environmental services under its GATS schedule, nor did it include environmental services in any previous FTA. In the Malaysia-New Zealand FTA, however, Malaysia agreed to include wastewater management, cleaning services of exhaust gases, natural and landscape protection, and noise abatement services. In maritime services, Malaysia agreed to raise the equity limit for New Zealand service suppliers from the 30 percent commitment in the ASEANAustralia-New Zealand FTA to 49 percent.
In turn, New Zealand expanded market access for Malaysian service suppliers. Its commitments included three new subsectors: services incidental to mining, mailing list compilation services, and washing and dry cleaning services. It also reduced restrictions on market access in seven subsectors: services incidental to animal husbandry, wholesale trade services, non-life insurance and insurance intermediation services, maritime transport, air transport, and commission agent services.
In addition to improved market access, the Malaysia-New Zealand FTA includes ASEANAustralia-New Zealand FTA-plus provisions on MFN obligations and the movement of natural persons.
Th e Malaysia-New Zealand FTA grants MFN to specifi c sectors of commercial interest, including private education, environmental, engineering and computer services, and services incidental to mining.
Th is improves substantially on the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA, which does not include MFN treatment for any service sector. On mode 4 provisions, New Zealand maintained the provisions included in the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA. In contrast, Malaysia substantially expanded its mode 4
obligations by providing New Zealand business persons greater market access to Malaysia. Th is is achieved by broadening the defi nition of "business person," removing market testing for intra-corporate transferees, increasing the length of stay for business persons or services suppliers from fi ve to ten years, and improving the timeframe for processing applications for temporary access. Th ese provisions should create signifi cant new business opportunities, especially through the improved commitments on commercial presence in areas like banking where Korea had been particularly closed off to foreign suppliers. Th e expanded market access in fi nancial services achieved in the KORUS FTA will help US fi nancial institutions increase their market presence in Korea, and the additional trade and investment from US suppliers will help promote competition and provide diversifi ed fi nancial services more effi ciently in the Korean market.
V. Services in the KORUS FTA
In addition to GATS-plus provisions, Korea made new commitments on legal services, education and health care services, express delivery, and sports and recreation services. Th ese sectors were excluded from Korea's GATS schedule. For example, for the fi rst time, Korea agreed to allow foreign legal consulting services in the Korea market. Th e KORUS FTA allows US fi rms to establish joint ventures in legal services, and permits US law fi rms to enter into cooperative agreements with local law fi rms and establish offi ces to provide legal consultancy services (United States Department of Commerce 2011). In express delivery services, Korea and the United States agreed to reduce customs clearing time to no longer than four hours, down from the six hour target that has been included in past US FTAs. Commitments on express delivery also include a commitment by Korea to reform Korea Post (the state-owned enterprise that is one of the largest providers of insurance, banking, and express delivery services). Korea agreed to reduce the number of services Korea Post provides and ensure independent regulation, on par with private service providers (Cooper et al 2011) .
Other notable provisions include a separate chapter on electronic commerce (e-commerce) and the inclusion of government procurement services, a sector that is normally excluded from services agreements. Th e United States and Korea agreed to provide equal treatment for electronically delivered services and similar products delivered physically. Th is is achieved through binding obligations to provide 13 non-discriminatory and duty-free treatment for all digital products transmitted electronically. Th e United
States and Korea also committed to facilitate paperless trading by making trade administration documents available to the public in electronic form. Th e provisions included in the agreement on government procurement of services expand market access (e.g., by including digital and information technology products) and lower the threshold value for central government contracts from $203,000 to $100,000
(United States Department of Commerce 2011).
Th e main defi ciency of the KORUS agreement is its lack of commitments on mode 4. Th e only notable provision is a commitment by the United States to extend the validity of L-1 visas for intracompany transferees to fi ve years, up from the one to three year period that existed previously ). With regard to GATS rules on emergency safeguard measures, subsidies, and government procurement, countries have not been able to agree on disciplines that go beyond existing GATS commitments. Consequently no text was tabled, and the discussion remained conceptual in nature (WTO 2011) . Th e only area where negotiations progressed was regarding special treatment for LDCs. Even then, however, diff erences arose over the terms of a proposed LDC waiver, which would excuse WTO members from their MFN obligation under GATS when granting preferential treatment to service suppliers originating in LDC countries.
THE DOHA ROUND: WHAT WASN'T DONE AND WHAT COULD HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED

Dropping the Ball in 2008
In May 2008, the Chairman of the Doha Round negotiating group on services issued a sobering report outlining elements required for the completion of services negotiations. At the time, 71 countries had submitted initial off ers, and 30 of those countries had also submitted revised off ers. Of the 71 off ers, 13
were from Asian countries including China, Taipei, Hong Kong and Macao, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore, and Th ailand. Overall, the off ers-from both 14 developed and developing countries-focused primarily on business and fi nancial services and to a lesser extent on telecommunications and tourism services (Marchetti and Roy 2008) . Scant progress was made in key sectors such as professional services, maritime transportation, construction, distribution, and health and environmental services Roy 2008, Borchert et al 2011) .
Th e May 2008 report identifi ed the main problems in the Doha Round as the participants' level of ambition, their reluctance to bind existing and improved levels of market access and national treatment, and limited off ers with respect to the treatment of sectors and modes of supply of export interest to developing countries (especially mode 4). Left unsaid was the sad truth that the Doha Round negotiations on services did not progress very far because many developing countries insisted that countries agree on the modalities for liberalizing agriculture and non-agricultural market access (NAMA) before seriously engaging in talks on services. Substantive negotiations on services trade never really got started.
In July 2008, the Chair of the Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC) convened a "signaling conference" to assess the progress that had been made and how the current off ers on services liberalization might be improved. Th e Chairman's report indicates that countries were prepared to issue new or improved off ers, and identifi ed thirteen sectors where these improvements could be made. Particular attention was given to business and fi nancial services, telecommunications, environmental and energy services.
Discussion on audiovisual, distribution, education and health services was fairly shallow; only a few participants signaled a "general" interest in further liberalization in these sectors, and no concrete off ers or recommendations were made. Despite indications that countries would be willing to undertake additional services liberalization, new substantive off ers were not forthcoming. In April 2011, the Chairman's report concluded that no substantial progress had been made since July 2008, and that signifi cant gaps remained between off ers and requests.
Ongoing research by the World Bank Mattoo 2009 and shows that the Doha Round off ers are on average twice as restrictive as policies currently applied by WTO countries. However, the off ers of South Asian countries do signifi cantly improve upon their Uruguay Round commitments. In contrast, Doha Round off ers of East Asia and Pacifi c countries do not improve much on existing policies . Moreover, Cambodia, Mongolia, Vietnam, and Bangladesh did not submit any off ers on services. In sum, if the Doha Round was concluded with the current services off ers, the agreement would not achieve much new liberalization in services but would "lock in" a portion of the reforms that countries already have implemented (Hufbauer, Schott, and Wong 2010) .
Foregone Benefi ts of a Doha Round Deal
To be blunt, WTO negotiators missed a big bet by keeping services negotiations on the sidelines for most of the Doha decade. Th is tactical blunder contributed importantly to the impasse in the Doha Round and prevented participating countries from reaping substantial trade and welfare gains. How much?
We summarize in table 5 the fi ndings of three major assessments by CEPII (Fontagné, Guillin, and Mitaritonna 2011) for the European Commission, the Peterson Institute for International Economics (Hufbauer, Schott, and Wong 2010) , and the World Bank .
Quantifying barriers to services trade is complex, and negotiating strategies to create a "level playing fi eld" necessarily must traverse a fi ne line between "legitimate" regulatory constraints (e.g., prudential safeguards for fi nancial services) and those that mask protectionist intent. In the academic literature, various methodologies are deployed to measure the level of restrictiveness or openness of trade regimes and to calculate the tariff equivalent of regulatory barriers to services trade. Th e authors of the CEPII study use the tariff equivalents estimated by Fontagné, Guillin, and Mitaritonna (2011) for nine services sectors and 65 countries based on the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP), and compute the average protection applied by each importer, using a fi xed eff ects methodology. Overall, they fi nd that developed countries have the lowest levels of protection in services. On a sectoral basis transport is the most liberalized sector, while construction is the most protected.
Th e CEPII authors apply these tariff equivalents to their model, and assume a 3 percent reduction in protection in all industrialized, Latin American, and Asian countries (excluding Central Asia). Th eir results
show that the largest gains in terms of additional exports will be seen in the European Union-roughly $15 billion of additional services exports representing more than half of their projected increase in world trade in services. Exports of services in Asian countries will stagnate, except in India where an additional $120 million of exports are estimated as a result of liberalization. In terms of the impact on value added in services sectors in Asia, construction and transportation will benefi t the most, fi nancial and business services the least.
In the Peterson Institute analysis conducted by Hufbauer, Schott, and Wong (2010) , the authors place special emphasis on the fi ndings on tariff equivalents reported by Gootiiz and Mattoo (2009 Th e World Bank study .
SERVICES NEGOTIATIONS: PROSPECTS GOING FORWARD
Th e Doha Round negotiations have made little progress in increasing market access and reducing barriers to trade in services. Negotiations were linked to the successful outcome of the two other pillars of the DDA-agriculture and NAMA-and were put on the back burner as countries tried to resolve the more contentious issues in those other areas. In addition the prospective gains from the WTO negotiations seemed to be distributed unevenly, prompting countries to conclude that the prospective gains would not justify the domestic political risk of seeking changes in existing policies (Schott 2011) . As a result, services negotiations stagnated; off ers that were submitted were shallow. Th e most protected sectors were not subject to substantive negotiations and the off ers that were submitted did not refl ect the liberalization that had already taken place . Th e lack of substantial progress has led a number of proposals to move away from the off er-request negotiations to a plurilateral approach.
In the past most liberalization in services trade has taken place unilaterally or through the inclusion of a services component in preferential trade arrangements (PTAs). Hoekman, Martin, and Mattoo (2010) found that "applied" services policies (i.e., those currently in eff ect) are more liberal than the liberalization commitments made by WTO members in the GATS. In other words, countries provide more open access to their markets than they are willing to guarantee through multilateral trade obligations. Similarly, Roy, Marchetti, and Lim (2007) and Marchetti and Roy (2008) 10. Under a scoring system developed by Marchetti and Roy (2008) , where 0 represents no commitment and 100 indicates full commitment in all subsectors across modes 1 and 3, Singapore doubles its "score" on services commitments from roughly 25 in GATS to over 80 in its FTAs
In large measure, the Uruguay Round eff ectively bound existing policies, ensuring that WTO members will not introduce new protectionist measures in sectors covered by GATS commitments. If the Doha Round had concluded, it would have had the same "lock in" eff ect. However, now that the conclusion of the Doha Round seems unlikely, future liberalization of services will likely take place through Under the TPP agreement, services are being negotiated as part of the overall "high-standard" agreement mandated by TPP leaders. Liberalization in services is being negotiated based on a negative list approach, which basically requires participants to schedule "non-conforming measures" that would not be covered by TPP obligations (Elms and Lim 2012) . Such an approach would provide maximum coverage of MFN, national treatment, and transparency obligations and thereby augment rules and market access commitments already embodied in the GATS. Negotiators also are seeking to improve transparency and streamline regulations to ensure they are not unnecessarily burdensome.
To those ends, offi cials will likely look to existing agreements like the KORUS and the New-ZealandMalaysia FTAs for negotiating precedents. Th e KORUS FTA contains very high standards on fi nancial services, insurance, and express delivery services, while the New Zealand-Malaysia FTA contains GATS-plus market access commitments in education, environment, maritime, tourism, management consulting, and veterinary services. If the TPP includes such provisions, it will substantially upgrade the breadth and quality of services liberalization undertaken by participating countries in their existing bilateral and regional trade pacts.
II. An International Services Agreement
At .
Second, multilateral negotiations on services also have underperformed. In the Doha Round, the insistence by developing countries that modalities for liberalizing agriculture and non-agricultural market access be completed before seriously engaging in talks on services meant that substantive negotiations on services trade never really got started. Th irteen Asian countries presented initial services off ers in the Doha
Round that did not presage changes in existing barriers to trade and investment. In contrast, evolving services trade initiatives in the Asia-Pacifi c region and plurilateral proposals in the WTO seek to achieve more substantial trade and investment reforms across a broader range of service sectors, particularly infrastructure services that are important contributors to productivity growth across the economy.
Th ird, within developing Asia most countries have not been active participants in services trade negotiations in the GATS/WTO and have undertaken only token obligations in regional trade arrangements. In most instances, these commitments have codifi ed current practice and have not helped
propel domestic economic reform. Th at said, there is something to be said for the importance of policy predictability in encouraging investment, so making current restrictive policies more transparent and "locking them in" may have positive, though hard to quantify, benefi ts.
To that end, we advocate a stronger eff ort by developing Asian countries to prioritize services negotiations in their regional arrangements, and to expand coverage of services in those pacts to a broad range of infrastructure services that are included in other FTAs in force or under construction in the Asia-Pacifi c region, like the TPP. In addition, these countries should volunteer to participate in prospective new plurilateral services initiatives like the ISA, and seek inclusion of obligations for developed country signatories to provide administrative and technical support to help developing Asia establish and implement the required new regulatory regimes. Tariff equivalent barriers of services are from CEPII (Fontagné, Guillin, and Mitaritonna, 2011) . Services barriers take two forms:
-An export tax in the case of communication and transport services.
-Additional iceberg trade cost in the case of other services. The scenarios are implemented in 2012. Phasing out is applied linearly over 5 years for developed countries, 10 years for developing countries, and 12 years for recently acceded countries.
World:
-The estimated GDP gains from a 3 percent reduction in services barriers are $15 billion, or 10 percent of total GDP gains (agriculture plus non-agricultural market access (NAMA) plus services).
-Services exports would increase by $34 billion, or 10 percent of total exports. Asia 1 :
-The estimated GDP gains are $4.8 billion, or 32 percent of total GDP gains from services liberalization.
-China accounts for 16 percent of these gains, followed by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) which accounts for 6 percent (see table 2 ).
-Results show that services exports for all Asian countries, except India, will stagnate.
-The largest sectoral gains in terms of value added are in construction and transportation.
Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE), 2010 Partial equilibrium analysis to calculate the impact of a 10 percent reduction in barriers to services trade for a sample of 21 countries. 2 Use tariff equivalent barriers estimates reported in Wang, Mohan, and Rosen (2009), with adjustments to a few of the tariff equivalent values. Assume the 10 percent reduction could be achieved by various changes in policies across countries, and that these would be binding commitments in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) schedules that actually lower the applied level of services barriers.
-The estimated gains in GDP from trade gains (exports plus imports) amounts to $45.5 billion.
-Global services exports increase by $55 billion, imports by $49.8 billion. Asia:
-Services exports (among the sample 21 countries) are estimated to increase by $11.5 billion. China accounts for approximately 30 percent of these exports; Japan and Korea account roughly 20 and 15 percent.
-Imports would increase by $21.5 billion. China accounts for 34 percent of this total and India accounts for roughly 20 percent.
The World Bank, 2011 A survey of applied trade in services policies in 32 developing countries and 24
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. Compares applied policies with these countries' GATS commitments in services, and the best offers that they have made in the current Doha negotiations. Summarizes key restrictions in each sector to construct restrictiveness index for services trade policies. These are then mapped on a 5-point scale ranging from 0 (no restrictions) to 1 (highly restricted). Sector results are aggregated across modes of supply using weights that reflect the relative importance of the different modes for each sector.
-The best offers submitted in the Doha negotiations improve on Uruguay Round commitments by 10 percent but are on average 2.3 times more restrictive than actual policies in the respective countries.
-Overall actual policy is substantially more liberal than Uruguay Round (UR) commitments, and Doha offers improve somewhat upon UR commitments, but the offer gap still remains large. -SAR has a services trade restrictiveness index (STRI) of 40.7, while East Asia Pacific (EAP) has an STRI of 39.9 (the highest STRI after the Middle East and North Africa and Gulf Cooperation Council groupings).
-Southeast Asia Region (SAR) and EAP countries have restrictive policies in place. However, the Doha offers submitted by SAR countries improve more on their UR commitments than the Doha offers submitted by EAP countries.
-At the sectoral level Doha offers from SAR and EAP offer the most in telecommunications and maritime shipping. They offer the least in retail distribution, maritime auxiliary, and professional services.
Note: Regi ona l s ervi ces tra de restrictiveness i ndex (STRI) i s ca l cul a ted a s s i mpl e a vera ges of i ndi vi dua l country's STRI. 
